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Abstract 
 
The United States conducted sixty-seven nuclear tests in total at Bikini and 
Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958. This article 
discusses the U.S. nuclear test issues in the Marshall Islands, focusing on the local 
people who have not been able to apply for the U.S. compensation, especially those on 
Ailuk Atoll. Until today, little attention has been given to these areas.  
Interviews with survivors as well as declassified U.S. documents make it clear 
that the nuclear tests have been affecting Ailuk people, not only victims of the four 
atolls: Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik recognized by the U.S. government. It 
is time for us to pay greater attention to not only the four atolls but also to the other 
areas to remind ourselves of the real nuclear legacy of the Pacific Islands.  
This paper shows how the United States has been underestimating the nuclear 
test effects on the Marshall Islands. In addition, this article asks not only the United 
States but also all of us to review the real nature of the nuclear disasters resulting.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
This year, 2018, marks the 60th year since 
the final nuclear testing that took place in the 
Marshall Islands, located in the middle western 
part of the Pacific Ocean. Paying heed to the 
nuclear devastation since the wartime atomic 
bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this 
article focuses on the Marshall Islands, where 
the United States conducted sixty-seven tests 
in total at Bikini and Enewetak Atoll between 
1946 and 1958. One of these tests was code 
named ‘Bravo’ in Operation Castle and took 
place on March 1, 1954 on Bikini Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands. The radioactive ash from the 
H-bomb explosion fell on the indigenous people 
as well as Japanese fishermen boats: The Fifth 
Lucky Dragon (Daigo-Fukuryu-Maru), and 
others2.  
Bikini Atoll today only reveals beautiful 
tropical scenery like a ‘paradise,’ rather than a 
former nuclear test site. The radioactive 
fallout however, continues to threaten the 
basis of daily life in the local communities up 
to now (Takemine 2015: 65-111). “None of 
which have faded with time. This is 
exacerbated by the U.S. not being honest as to 
the extent of radiation, and the lingering 
effects the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing 
Program would have on our lives, ocean and 
                                                     
1 This paper is an expanded and revised version of 
a presentation delivered at Marshall Islands 
Nuclear Legacy Conference sponsored by Office of 
the President, Republic of the Marshall Islands on 
March 1, 2017, Majuro. Part of this work has 
already been presented in Japanese; Takemine 
(2015:113-154). 
land, and by the U.S. not willing to address 
the issue of adequate compensation as well as 
for the radiological clean-up of our islands” 
(Hine 2017). President of the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, Hilda C. Hine remarked in 
2017 on Nuclear Victims and Survivors 
Remembrance Day in Majuro, the capital city 
of the Marshall Islands. 
In this speech, the president also 
mentioned that “The myth of only four 
‘exposed’ atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap 
and Utrik, has shaped U.S. nuclear policy on 
the Marshallese people since 1954, which 
limited medical and scientific follow up, and 
compensation programs” (Hine 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The United States has officially admitted 
that nuclear test damage was incurred on four 
atolls only: Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and 
2 The victims of Japanese fishermen are not limited 
to the crews of the Fifth Lucky Dragon. It is 
estimated that approximately 1,000 fishing boats 
and ships were exposed to the radiation as a 
consequence of Operation Castle, a series of nuclear 
tests including ‘Bravo’ (Kochi ken bikini suibaku 
hisai chousadan 2004). 
｜ 44 ｜
 
 
Utirik (Fig.1). Other areas, such as Ailuk Atoll 
have been excluded from the U.S. 
compensation and health care program. 
This area has been forgotten not only in 
the U.S. but also in academia. Fieldwork to 
study the nuclear aftermath has not been 
conducted thoroughly in these 
unacknowledged areas. History of the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission (Hewlett and 
Anderson 1962; Hewlett and Duncan 1969; 
Hewlett and Holl 1989) and history of US 
nuclear testing: Elements of Controversy 
(Hacker 1994) have been published. These 
history books, however, do not refer at all to 
areas such as Ailuk Atoll. 
Up to now, little attention has been given 
to these areas. That is why this article 
discusses the nuclear catastrophe focusing 
beyond the four atolls: Bikini, Enewetak, 
Rongelap and Utrik, with special attention to 
Ailuk Atoll, Marshall Islands. 
When the full scale investigation began in 
2001, there was no record of who had direct 
experience with the nuclear test on Ailuk. In 
order to begin the research, a visit to all 
houses to look for survivors from the test was 
needed. As a result of this survey, fifty three 
survivors were found and a total of forty-six 
interviews3 conducted. 
The argument develops from my field 
research in 2001, 2004 and 2013, through 
which I have conducted interviews with the 
Ailuk survivors and other related persons in 
                                                     
3 The forty-six interviews are translated to 
Japanese and stored in Takemine 2005.  
the Marshall Islands. In addition, it analyzes 
official documents from the U.S. Department 
of Energy which has jurisdiction over nuclear 
development. The declassified documents are 
compared with the testimonies of survivors, 
which were exhaustively gathered through 
fieldwork. 
Based on these materials, this paper 
reveals nuclear damage occurred on Ailuk 
Atoll. This example makes it clear that the 
U.S. has underestimated its nuclear legacy in 
the Marshall Islands. Also, this paper inquires 
where the nuclear disaster area is consequent 
to the nuclear testing. The key phrase is 
“invisible nuclear catastrophe.” 
 
 
2. Testimonies on the Day of ‘Bravo’ Shot 
 
The United States detonated a high 
yield thermonuclear weapon, code named 
‘Bravo’, on a reef off Namu Island in 
Bikini Atoll at 6:45am on March 1, 1954. 
Ailuk is located 291 nautical miles (539 km) 
to the south east of ground zero, with 401 
inhabitants on the day of the test (Clarkson 
and Graves 1954). 
It was before sunrise when the bomb 
exploded. The sky was getting bright. Lajre 
was still sleeping at his home; but some were 
starting their morning routines. Joata was 
washing his face. Daina remembers the day 
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“I just woke up and prepare the breakfast. 
Then I was shaving the copra (dried coconuts 
meat).” Lilla was collecting fallen leaves of 
breadfruit with her daughter. Lailmok was 
climbing and tapping a palm tree for sap 
called Jagar. 
Some islanders were fishing. Lene, a then 
twenty-year-old man, testifies that “I went to 
lagoon with other three men. Early morning 
was the best time for fishing.” In the ocean, 
Mejjon was sailing by in his traditional 
Marshallese canoe. Some ladies were 
producing traditional handicrafts made of 
coconuts and pandanus leaves called 
Amimono. “I was weaving Jagi (a traditional 
mat made of pandanus leaves) at my house,” 
Rine recalls. On the islands, kids were 
playing. Then six-year-old girl, Nety was 
running around on the beach. Rosha was 
having fun with her friends.  Some babies 
were in their parent’s arms. 
It was a typical morning on Ailuk. The 
local people never knew that the United 
States would conduct a nuclear test on the 
Marshall Islands. Their peaceful morning 
was permanently changed by the H-bomb test 
‘Bravo.’ 
Suddenly, “sky on western side of the 
island began turning red and yellow, looking 
like a fire. The red and yellow colors 
reflected in the lagoon,” Koju remembers 
that day. 
“The red flash lights up the sky on north 
and western side. The color of the sea also 
turned to red. Then, I saw the cloud made its 
way up into the sky,” Mejjon points at the sky. 
Joata shares his surprise: “A bucket of water 
that I was using for washing my face was 
shaking. Why is the water red and yellow? I 
didn’t know what was happening at the 
moment. The ground was also shaking.” 
“I heard the big sound. It had never 
heard before,” Cement, who was standing on 
the beach, explains. Then t hirteen-year-old 
boy, Tempo was fishing at the moment. He 
remembers that “‘Boom’ I heard the big 
explosion in the lagoon. It was not only one 
time. Every few minutes I heard the sound 
and it continued around three to four more 
times.” 
“The trees were shaking. It was like 
typhoon,” Lilla reports. Everything was 
shaking on the islands. By the blast and air 
pressure, “Glass windows of a church was 
blown off,” Lene points out the church. 
Ailuk people were frightened. “Jesus 
Show Me the Way” riding on the Marshallese 
canoe, Tempo and other three men started 
singing gospel song asking “the help to God.” 
Rine rushed out from her house to look for 
her husband, she went searching for him. 
Then nine-year-old girl, Ertine says with a 
shy smile “my friends and I hid in my room 
and covered with cloth.” Stella tells that her 
parents instructed the kids to hide in a well. 
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She adds that “In Japanese times, my parents 
had an experience to run to the well during 
World War II.” 
“What is going on?” the Atoll was in 
turmoil. Nobody knew what it was. Endy 
observes that “the war started again? I 
thought that the war was already ended, but.” 
Only ten years had passed since the end of 
the Pacific War in the islands, so some people 
were reminded of that time by the big sound. 
From the flash over the sky, Jato recalled 
“at first, I thought that it was a beautiful 
rainbow. But soon, I realized it was not.” 
Some even foreboding “the end of the world 
finally came.” Christianity had already been 
widespread in Ailuk. The people believed the 
famous quote from the Bible, “the bright light 
coming from the east is seen even in the west; 
so will be the coming of the Son of man,” which 
is a signal of the termination of the world. 
A few days later, almost all the survivors 
mention that “big American ships came to the 
islands.” Biem explains, describing the size 
of the ship with his hands, that “I had never 
seen such a large ship. The ship had big guns. 
I was very scared.” Kodama saw with her eyes 
the “big ship” approaching to Ailuk; she was 
so frightened that she hid under a tree. The 
large ship convinced people that another “war 
started again.” And people were getting more 
and more terrified. 
From this “big ship,” Americans landed 
on Ailuk. After that, Temple observed 
“Americans started to distribute candies, 
chocolates, and chewing gum to kids.” 
Candies kept kids engaged and excited. On 
the other hands, most adults were gathering 
around a church and watching a conversation 
between magistrate Typhoon and an 
American officer. The translator was Lan 
Lakapun who is from Jalut Atoll, Marshall 
Islands. 
Neiwin remembers that “the American 
officer told that ‘Ailuk is contaminated.’” In 
addition, Jato notes that “the American told 
us we came here to evacuate people.” However, 
“the magistrate responded, ‘The islands are 
not destroyed. There is no problem,’” Pero 
adds. One survivor, Daina, explains that “he 
did not want us to leave the island.” No one 
would object to the avoidance of evacuation 
plans. “I felt good when I heard the news. I did 
not want to leave Ailuk,” Neiwin stating her 
feeling at that time. 
The United State did not secure a place for 
evacuation, and thus the locals continued to 
stay on the island. Yet evacuations took place 
in nearby Rongelap and Utrik atolls. 
Even though the Ailuk people were not 
evacuated, some local people testify that 
“Americans warned our representative not to 
use rainwater.” Rilong adds that “My father 
was magistrate and he told my family 
to ’throw away the water from the catchment 
and do not use it.’” 
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3. The US Official Recorded Fallout on Ailuk, 
but… 
 
How did the United States officially 
recognize the radiation exposure to the 
Ailuk people after the ‘Bravo’ shot? The U.S. 
Joint Tasks Force Seven mobilized the army, 
navy and air force, Atomic Energy 
Committee, and scientists to conduct the 
nuclear test. On the following day of the test, 
The Joint Task Force sent a research group 
from the U.S. military base in Kwajalein 
Atoll, Marshall Islands by aircraft, named 
ABLE, in order to monitor the radiation 
(Clarkson and Graves 1954).  
Based on the survey, Joint Task Force 
Seven grasped the fact that ‘Bravo’ 
radioactive fallout fell not only on Bikini, 
Rongelap and Utrik but also on Ailuk Atoll. 
Richard A. House, a chief officer for 
radiation monitoring recorded fallout on 
Ailuk in the report titled “Discussion of Off-
Site Fallout” (House 1954a). In this 
document, the chief officer indicated the 
interesting points as described below: 
“the only other populated atolls which 
received fallout of any consequence at all 
was Ailuk. ABLE Pattern indicated 95 mr 
per hour at 1845 hrs, 2 March. Based upon 
the best estimate of fallout time it was 
calculated that a dose to infinite time 
would reach approximately 20 roentgens” 
(House 1954a). 
That is to say, U.S. Joint Task Force Seven 
found Ailuk Atoll also “received fallout of 
some consequence” in the days following the 
nuclear test. It calculated a dose “reaching 
approximately 20 roentgens”, meaning 200 
millisievert. This radioactivity level extends 
as high as 10 times of a standard which the 
Japanese government obliged evacuation 
people regarding to the contaminated area 
around Fukushima (Imanaka 2014). 
There is no doubt that the Ailuk people 
were exposed to radiation from the nuclear 
test ‘Bravo.’ However, keep in mind that the 
“20 roentgens” represents only external 
exposure. It must be considered that the 
local people received internal exposure as 
well, which is difficult to express numerically. 
When did the radiation fallout reach to 
Ailuk? Joint Task Force Seven 
Headquarters recorded a Memorandum for 
record subjected “BRAVO Shot, Operation 
CASTLE” on 12 April, 1954 (Clarkson and 
Graves 1954). This record consists of a 
remarkable appendix titled “tabulation of 
time of arrival date” which shows 
radiation fallout arrival times in each area 
of the Marshall Islands including Ailuk 
Atoll. According to the list, fallout reached 
Ailuk 27.1 hours after the detonation. 
Namely, Ailuk people were exposed to 
radioactive fallout before 10:00am on the 
next day after the Bravo shot. 
The U.S. official documentation states 
that “Ailuk people were exposed to fallout of 
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some consequence.” However, on the other 
hand, the survivors I have interviewed do 
not tell much about the ‘powder’ which 
exposed Rongelap people and The Lucky 
Dragon crews make reference. 
I asked the survivors directly, whether 
they had seen the powder. Some people 
answer, “Yes, I saw the powder.” Kanji 
explains in detail “we found the powder on 
the leaf of coconuts in the western part in 
Ailuk (main island of Ailuk Atoll). The color 
was yellow.” Rosha replies “powder? I saw it 
on the ground. The powder looked either 
orange or yellow color.” On the other hand, 
not all survivors witnessed the powder. 
Some of them do not remember the ‘powder.’ 
Lene answers “No, I did not see anything 
like a powder.” Cement replies “I didn’t see 
the powder, but I heard the story.” 
Did the powder really fall on Ailuk Atoll? 
On Rongelap Atoll, the powder fell on the 
ground like snow and piled up all over the 
islands (Congress of Micronesia 1973: 81‒82). 
Meanwhile, on Ailuk, it seems that the 
radioactive debris mainly became a mist 
that fell to the ground. That was similar to 
neighbor islands, Utrik Atoll4 where the 
United States admitted the effect of nuclear 
tests.  Also, it is expected that a few parts 
of Ailuk Atoll were slightly covered with the 
powder. 
                                                     
4 After the ‘Bravo’ shot, in Utrik Atoll, the 
radioactive debris became a mist and fell to the 
ground (Maeda 1978: 58‒59). 
Radioactive debris actually reached 
Ailuk. However, for survivors, it is quite 
difficult to recognize the fallout because the 
local people cannot sense the radiation and 
had no idea how to detect fallout in their 
surroundings. 
As Kanji testified, some adults warned 
kids not to get close to the mysterious powder. 
On the other hand, “the powder was colorful. 
I thought it is good to put the color for my 
handicraft making,” Rise tells. The powder 
was radioactive fallout, but it looked 
“beautiful” in her eyes. Ailuk people were 
exposed to fallout without noticing the 
radioactivity. 
 
 
4. Cancelled Evacuation Plan for Ailuk People 
 
As noted above, the local people testify 
that “the U.S. big ship came to Ailuk.” Is this 
“big ship” identified in the U.S. official 
documentation? The U.S. Joint Task Force 
Seven kept records about the “big ship” 
stopping at Ailuk after the ‘Bravo’ shot. This 
is the memorandum in Joint Task Force 
Seven Headquarters from Major R. D. Crea 
to Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, 
subjected “Report on Soil and Water 
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Sampling Mission” on 8 March, 1954 (Crea 
1954). 
Based upon this document, it is clear that 
what the local people described as a “big ship” 
is the U.S. destroyer ship named “Renshaw”. 
This memorandum also identifies the name of 
the translator “Lan Lakapun.” The name also 
fits in with the testimonies. 
According to the official record, the details 
of the “big ship” are as follows (Crea 1954): 
The U.S. Joint Task Force Seven assigned a 
special research group on the USS Renshaw 
(DOE499) from Kwajalein to Likiep Atoll, 
Jemo Island, Ailuk Atoll and Mejit Island. The 
U.S. ship reached to Ailuk at approximately 
1600M, on March 6, 1954, five days after the 
Bravo shot. The landing party moved ashore 
by whaleboat and obtained water and soil 
samples. Readings with the MX showed 
approximately 3 mr/hr (off the 2 mr scale). 
An An/PDR-27E showed a high reading of 7 
mr/hr, however, on a different scale a reading 
of 12 or 15 mr/hr was obtained. The MX-5 
reading is probably closest to accurate. No 
significant variation was detected on bare 
feet or clothing of individuals. Samples and 
readings were taken at approximately 1700, 
March 6, 1954. 
The above documentation confirms that 
a U.S. ship came to Ailuk. Meanwhile, there 
is currently no record of what the U.S. 
representative told to the magistrate. 
However, there is a remarkable note on a U.S. 
government document about the evacuation 
on Ailuk, to which the local people testified, as 
mentioned before. 
The title is “Radsafe Narrative Sequence 
of Events” written by Richard A. House, chief 
officer of radiation monitoring (House 1954b). 
This note is attached to a memorandum of 
Joint Task Force Seven’s Headquarter office 
on 12 April, 1954, written by Alvin C. 
Graves, Scientific Director and P.W. Clarkson, 
Major General, U.S. Army Commander. 
In this documentation, Richard A. House 
mention that “With the decision to evacuate 
Utirik made […], the status of Ailuk was put 
up for consideration. This atoll has a 
population of 401” (House 1954b). The record 
shows that the United States planned to 
evacuate the Ailuk people after the nuclear 
test. However, they did not take any action to 
evacuate after all. It was quite different from 
the neighboring Rongelap and Utrik people. 
Why were the Ailuk people left on the 
contaminated island? The U . S .  chief officer 
of radiation monitoring explains “The infinity 
dose was determined at less than 20 r., i.e., 
less than the minimum standard used by the 
task force for its sampling aircraft crews” 
(House 1954b). He also stated in another 
document that “Balancing the effort required 
to move the 400 inhabitants against the fact 
that such a dose would not be a medical 
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problem it was decided not to evacuate the 
atoll” (House 1954a). 
About the decision, Dr. Tetsuji Imanaka, 
Kyoto University, Japan major in atomic 
physics concerned about the late radiation 
effects that appear many years after 
irradiation in Ailuk. The independence 
scientist pointed out “This standard 2 0  
roentgen was set to avoid acute radiation 
syndromes that appear only after receiving 
a large amount of radiation. […] (However,) 
From the current standard to protect long-
term effects of radiation, that the Ailuk 
people had to evacuate as soon as possible 
after the contamination was found by the 
Bravo test” (Imanaka 2014). 
For the reason why evacuations were not 
carried out, the islanders whispered that “401 
persons on Ailuk has the large population 
compared to 157 persons on Utrik.” A wife of 
then magistrate Neiwn testifies that: 
“American asked about a population of Ailuk 
to my husband and he answered. Then, by 
two-way radio American told commander ‘the 
population is 401’. After a while, the 
commander said ‘the population is too big. 
Do not bring them.’” The population who were 
evacuated after the ‘Bravo’ test was 82 on 
Rongelap and 154 on Utrik meanwhile the 
inhabitance on Ailuk was 4015. 
                                                     
5 About the population at the time of the ‘Bravo’ 
shot in 1954, see Craves and Clarkson 1954.  
The Government of Republic of the 
Marshall Islands points out an integral dose 
to the Ailuk people comparing with the Utrik 
people who were evacuated in a petition to the 
Congress of the United States. “it is most 
reasonable to conclude that the airborne 
activity levels in the cloud passing over Ailuk 
were similar if not identical to that of Utrik. 
Moreover, because the people of Ailuk were 
not evacuated, the duration of exposure was, 
therefore, longer (essentially to “infinity”) and 
would have resulted in individual doses well 
in excess of doses received by individuals on 
Utrik” (RMI 2000: Appendix I-2). 
 
 
5. People Observed the “Abnormal 
Circumstances” 
 
More than six decades have passed since 
the nuclear test ‘Bravo’. In Ailuk, Marshallese 
canoes and free and easy living surrounded 
by beautiful emerald lagoons. The landscape 
of the atoll looks far removed from the effects 
of the nuclear test. However, the nuclear 
catastrophe has been gradually recognized 
through survivor’s testimony. 
Almost all survivors think that Ailuk 
was affected by “the bomb” based on their 
experiences. “The bomb changed our islands 
and destroyed our life,” Telio contemplates 
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the nuclear issues. Lene also feels that “The 
bomb destroyed everything. No good.” 
Why have the Ailuk people realized that 
they suffer from the nuclear test, even 
though, the catastrophe was unseen at the 
time of the testing? “We saw strange animals 
and plants,” “we had not seen this before” 
most survivors explain. People started to 
notice something unusual happening on this 
atoll. 
A main source of their diet, arrowroot, 
was significantly decreased. This made local 
people think about the effect of the test. “It 
used to be that there is a plenty of arrowroots 
everywhere in our islands. After the Bomb, it 
almost disappeared” Koju says. Cement 
remembers “When I came back to Ailuk in 
1964, arrowroots was decreasing. People 
were wondering where were the arrowroots.” 
Today, it is not easy to find arrowroots. 
Another important plant, the “palm tree 
is also affected by the bomb” the survivors also 
tell, because they saw something unusual in 
this tree. Normally, a palm tree grows one 
straight branch. However, “we started to see 
the palm tree that it spreads by two branches,” 
Neti testifies. Tempo remembers “I also saw 
the trees that it spread by three branches. In 
around 1959, I found the strange tree in 
remote island, Ailuk. When I open coconuts, 
surprisingly, there was no meat and juice.” 
Besides the arrowroot and palm tree, 
Ailuk people also mentioned the abnormal 
conditions of other local foods such as 
breadfruits and Pandanus boninensis. 
Not only the plants but also “animals 
were by the nuclear test.” Trsusila says “I saw 
the abnormal pig.” “We saw a pig that having 
both male and female reproductive organs,” 
Koju said surprised. Stela also mentions “I 
saw a dog with three legs, a pig with only 
one ball, and a chicken with one wing.” Telio 
believes that “our livestock such as chicken 
and pig are also poisoned. I am sure that the 
bomb created these animals, I can’t think 
about any other reasons.” 
Some women also speak about the 
miscarriage and stillbirth rates on this islands. 
Daina tells her experience: “I delivered the 
first baby in 1955, but the baby looked like 
in human condition. My second baby had 
physical handicap, one of his leg was short. 
Now he lives in Jalut Atoll, Marshall Islands, 
he cannot walk smoothly.” A fetus and a 
mother are connected by the mother’s 
umbilical cord which delivers nutrition and 
oxygen from the mother. However, Stella 
remembers that “a baby on this island was 
born without an umbilical cord and a head of 
the baby is directly connected to placenta. The 
other abnormal baby was born like the turtle 
eggs.” 
“One of my son had a birth defect. He had 
a twin brother, but soon after one was stopped 
breathing”, “Maybe, it effects of the bomb,” 
Lain says. In 2001, the remaining son became 
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16 years old, but he stays in his bed all the 
time except when he needs to eat. “Church 
people visit him to pray about four times a 
year,” Lain explains. “I have never taken 
him to a hospital in Majuro (capital city). It 
might be good idea to see a doctor in Hawaii, 
but can the doctor cure his conditions?” Lain 
wonders. Lain is the only health aid in Ailuk 
(At the time of 2001), but he cannot provide 
anything for his son.  
“After the bomb, many sicknesses 
appeared in Ailuk,” describes Nerai. An old 
man, Ritok describes “people got new 
diseases.” What are these “many sicknesses” 
and “new diseases” that they talk about? 
Most of the people mention thyroid 
abnormalities which is common among the 
local people. Cement says that “I am the first 
patient of thyroid problem in Ailuk.” He tells 
in detail: “in 1979, when I got a sick and 
went to the doctor in Majuro (capital city), I 
was diagnosed with thyroid tumor. After that 
I was sent to a US Army hospital in Hawaii, 
Tripler Army Medical Center Hospital and 
received an operation. I was in the hospital 
for four months. The doctor asked me ‘did 
you have an experience of the Bravo test?’ I 
received the scanning and X-ray examination, 
but nobody told me about the result.” 
Thyroid abnormalities occur also among 
the residents who were born after the ‘Bravo’ 
shot in 1954. Japanese doctors, Tetsuya 
Takahashi, Keisei Fujimori and others 
conducted the thyroid survey in the 
Marshall Islands including Ailuk. The 
report summarizes as follows: “7172 
Marshallese were examined, 4762 of whom 
were alive at the time of the A-bomb testing 
in the Marshall Islands.”; “The frequency of 
benign thyroid nodules and of thyroid cancer 
in the general population throughout the 
Marshall Islands appears to be high.”; 
“continuation of thyroid cancer surveillance, 
examinations of Marshallese who are not yet 
participants, and medical treatment, as 
necessary and where possible” (Takahashi et 
al. 2001: XV, XVI). Jepe, who was born in 
1956, two years after the test, tells that “the 
Japanese doctor found my thyroid problem. 
I’m scared now.” 
Many Ailuk people realize that the 
nuclear test causes the cancer on the island. 
Rine says “I lost my husband in 1972 and one 
of my daughter in 1988. Both of them had a 
cancer.” Ready speaks out that “Ailuk has 
problems of thyroid and cancer. Ailuk needs 
a medical doctor.” Cancer was not a common 
illness before the nuclear test, such a word 
doesn’t exist in their local language. To 
become cancer, however, is not unusual 
anymore on this island. 
People had several symptoms but they 
don’t know a specific name for their illness. 
During this interview, some people showed 
their lump and asked “why this happen?” 
Koju explains that “I have a bowl size lump. 
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It was getting big. Sometimes, I feel pain.” 
Endy says that “after the bomb, I developed 
a lump. It was cut off in 1997.” The residents 
firmly believe that the nuclear test also 
caused the lumps. And not a small number 
of people believe that the nuclear test brought 
diabetes and high blood pressures to this 
island, because “these sicknesses were not 
here before the test,” Nimits comments. 
As described above, Ailuk people started 
to see several strange things in their 
everyday life after the test. This is when 
they started to realize the effects of the 
nuclear test on Ailuk. 
It was not just a bomb. “The bomb has 
plenty of ‘poison,’” Endy describes the 
radiation with the word ‘poison.’ A word for 
‘radiation’ doesn’t exist in the Marshallese 
language. In their local language, the word 
for poison is ‘kadek.’ However, when the local 
people talk about the nuclear testing, they 
do not use the word ‘kadek,’ and borrow the 
English word ‘poison’. The meaning of 
‘kadek’ expresses only a condition of mind 
and body such as fish poisoning and alcoholic 
intoxication. After the nuclear testing they 
realized a new threat. Their original word 
‘kadek’ was insufficient in describing the 
serious effects on human bodies and 
environments. Eventually the word ‘poison’ 
became synonymous with this new threat, 
radiation. 
Mejjon expresses his concern that from 
the local food, “I ate ‘poison’ all the time on 
this island.” When first exposed to the 
nuclear test, “we didn’t know nothing about 
the ‘poison.’ American did not explain about 
the ‘poison’. But we know now that the 
‘poison’ was spread out in our islands,” Biem 
notes. Ailuk people see their invisible fallout 
damages based on their experience with the 
word ‘poison.’ 
However, ‘these abnormal circumstances’ 
which the local people testify to have not 
been properly recorded. They did not have the 
tools to record their circumstances at the time. 
The U.S. officials neglected to monitor what 
had been happening on Ailuk after the test. 
In addition, the suffering of the people has 
been ignored by researchers and journalists. 
‘These abnormal circumstances’ remain only 
in their memory. 
 
 
6. Unrealized Health Care and Monitoring 
Program 
 
As they started to identify the invisible 
radiation, the Ailuk people grew aware their 
rights had increased for demanding 
compensation from the United State. Jato 
asks that “America should compensate us.” 
Trsusila requests to return their land to the 
original state by saying “please remove the 
‘poison.’ we need the help from America.” 
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Nerai stresses his desire, “Give us our health 
back, our life and our island like we had before. 
I truly love Ailuk.” 
Some people wish every person could come 
to Ailuk to see their situation. Lilla wants 
“America to come to our islands and think 
about us.” Mata demands that “the bomb 
destroyed many things. Please come to Ailuk 
and listen about our story.” Biem hopes that 
“America should send us a doctor and pay the 
compensation to help our health.” 
However, that doesn't mean Ailuk 
people are always criticizing the United 
States directly. They tend to understate their 
feelings, but their incisive comments 
sometimes appear in their testimony. Ema 
asks a simple question “why did America 
tested the bomb on our islands? America has 
‘big islands’ (territory) and but why did they 
come to our ‘small islands’?” Tane points out 
that “America treated us like pig. They did not 
think Marshallese are human-being, so they 
didn’t care about us.” 
As noted above, Ailuk people started to 
raise awareness that we should receive 
compensation from the United State. However, 
it had been rare for them to raise the radiation 
issues to the outside by 2004. At the same time, 
outsiders do make an effort to hear the voices 
of survivors but they had not given much 
consideration to Ailuk. 
Since the middle of the 1990s, 40 years 
after the ‘Bravo’ test, fallout on Ailuk is finally 
recognized by the local newspaper and the 
Marshall Islands government. In February 
1995, Then Ambassador to the United States, 
Wilfred I. Kendall testified at the Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 
under the U.S. Clinton Administration as 
following: “Ailuk, Likiep and populations from 
every atoll in the country are experiencing 
radiation-linked illnesses as a result of the 
weapons testing program. (However,) The 
United States Government has always led us 
to believe that only four atolls were exposed to 
radioactive fall-out” (Kendall 1995). 
Following the statement, “Amb. Kendall 
to U.S.: The forgotten atolls need help” the 
only newspaper of the Marshall Islands, 
Marshall Islands Journal reported on the 
front page on February 24, 1995. After that 
the newspaper covers the follow-up “What 
about Ailuk?” on September 29, 2000 and 
“AILUK SAFE?” on the front page on April 13, 
2001. 
In September 2000, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands government submitted to 
the United States Congress a Petition to push 
forward a formal request for additional 
compensation for personal injuries, property 
damages and medical care programs (RMI 
2000). 
The Petition is based upon the provision 
‘changed circumstances’ pursuant to Article 
IX of the nuclear claims settlement agreement 
under the section 177 Agreement of the 
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Compact of Free Association enacted in 19866. 
In the article IX, “changed circumstance” 
provides possible additional compensation to 
the Marshall Islands, if loss or damages to 
persons or property arose or were discovered 
that could not reasonably have been identified 
as of the effective date of the agreement, and 
if such injuries rendered the provisions of the 
Compact “manifestly inadequate.” 
The petition argues that “new and 
additional” information since the enactment of 
the Compact; such as a wider extent of 
radioactive fallout than previously known and 
disclosed scientific or historical findings, 
which constituted “changed circumstances” 
(RMI 2000). Then the president of the 
Marshall Islands, Kessai H. Note asserted 
that “What might have been acknowledged by 
the Government of the United States in 1983 
as ‘damages resulting from the Nuclear 
Testing program’ is only a small portion of 
what such injuries and damages are now 
known to be” (RMI 2000:6). The former 
president of the Marshall Islands also pointed 
out that “the terms of Section 177 represent a 
political determined settlement rather than 
either a good faith assessment of personal 
injury or property claims” (RMI 2000:2). 
As part of the agenda, the Government of 
the Marshall Islands brought to the table the 
nuclear issues in Ailuk to the United States in 
                                                     
6  Regarding to the full text of the section 177 
Agreement of the Compact of Free Association, See; 
the petition. It requests, “there is critical need 
to include Ailuk under the health care 
program […]. Under the Agreement, these 
programs are currently restricted to persons 
of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik” 
(RMI 2000: Attachment II-5). 
In 2002, the Congress of the United 
States transmitted the request of the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands to the U.S. President 
for evaluation by the appropriate agencies. 
Then, in November 2004, the Bush 
Administration released “Report Evaluating 
the Request of the Government of the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands Presented to 
the Congress of the United States of America” 
(U.S. Department of State 2004). 
The Bush Administration set out a 
position that the Congress of the United 
States should reject any consideration of 
additional funding beyond the $150 million 
fund provided as part of a ‘full and final’ 
settlement agreed to in the section 177 
Agreement of the Compact of Free Association. 
Marshall Islands pointed out that fallout 
exposure spread to a far wider area of the 
Marshall Islands than the northerly atolls in 
the petition. However, the U.S. report asserts: 
“the weight of expert scientific evidence 
indicates that the present impact of 
radioactive fallout on the Marshall Islands 
Marshall Islands. Committee on Political Education 
1983: 145-165. 
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is limited to the more northerly atolls and 
islands” (U.S. Department of State 2004). 
However, the Bush Administration did 
not conduct any filed investigation. The report 
also had some inconsistencies with official 
documentations they themselves had written. 
For instance, an official document shows 
that U.S. officials considered responding to 
the fallout problem on Ailuk which the Bush 
administration denied. The document title is 
“Increased DOE responsibilities in the 
Marshall Islands” (Wachholz 1980) 7. Who 
wrote this paper? Marshallese.  No, a US 
official in the Department of Energy made 
this report. 
According to the document (Wachholz 
1980), the U.S. Department of Energy 
examined the following health care program: 
1. Provide general medical care to the people 
of Rongelap, Utrik, Bikini, and Enewetak in 
addition to examination and treatment, if 
necessary, for radiation related diseases. 2. 
Include atolls in addition to those identified 
above (e.g. Likiep, Wotje, Ailuk, Mejit). It says 
that “The inclusion of island, and a medical 
survey of additional people was estimated the 
people of at approximately $750,000 for 
every 200 persons added to the program (e.g., 
Enewetak-$1.7M; Likiep-$2.3M; Wotje- 
$1.3M;  Ailuk-$1.6M;  Mejit-$1,3M)”. In 
                                                     
7 Another official internal documents which Bruce 
W. Wachhloz; Department of Energy sent to M. J. 
Cifrino; Department of Defense.on Oct 17, 1979 is 
also important (Wachholz 1978). In the 
brief, for Ailuk people, the Department of 
Energy planned to introduce a medical follow 
up program from 1983. 
In addition, regarding the 
environmental monitoring, the U.S. official 
notes that “radiological surveys, research 
programs and dose assessments need to be 
continued indefinitely at Bikini and 
Enewetak, and expanded” (Wachholz 1980). 
Then, the Department of Energy planned to 
start the environmental monitoring program 
on Ailuk from 1985. 
This document date is on Jan 22, 1980, 
when Marshall Islands negotiated Compact 
of Free Association with the United State 
about compensation for the nuclear tests. Its 
author, Bruce W. Wachholz, at the Office of 
Environment, Department of Energy was one 
of the negotiators on behalf of the United 
States. 
In Section 177 of Compact of Free 
Association undersigned in 1982 and ratified 
in 1986, “The Government of the United 
States accepts responsibility for 
compensation owing to citizens of the 
Marshall Islands […] for loss or damage to 
property and person of the citizens of the 
Marshall Islands […] resulting from the 
nuclear testing program.” 
documentation, Bruce W. Wachhloz estimated cost 
about the medical care program to Likiep; 600 
persons $2.3M, Wotje; 340 persons $1.3M, Ailuk; 
430 persons $1.6M, Mejit; 350 persons $1.3M.  
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The United States recognized 
responsibility, but only for four atolls; Bikini, 
Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik; and set the 
provision on “full settlement of all claims” 
with providing the sum of $150 million in 
the agreement of section 177 of the Compact 
of Free Association8. 
It drew a boundary, removing Ailuk. 
Ailuk atoll was separated from neighboring 
Utrik atoll and excluded from the U.S. 
compensation. The Department of Energy’s 
plan which provides health care and 
conducting environmental monitoring for 
people in Ailuk vanished in smoke. 
 
 
7. Should Transfer Nuclear Disaster Fallout 
Map 
 
In the negotiation for compensation, on 
behalf of the Marshall Islands, Carles T. 
Domnick stressed that “the people of all other 
atolls of the Marshall Islands are entitled 
to the medical care provided for in the 
statute. We find no statutory basis for 
discriminating between people of these 
atolls”; “we insist that all other Marshallese 
from ‘exposed’ atolls must be accorded that 
same consideration” (Domnick 1980). 
On the other hand, during this 
negotiation, the representative of the United 
States repeatedly said that nuclear-affected 
areas were only the “four” atolls. However, a 
negotiator on behalf of the Marshall Islands, 
Tony DeBrum feels the frustration that “The 
choice to sign the 177 agreement was based on 
faulty, sometimes outright duplicitous 
information”(DeBrum 2017).  
A U.S. official documentation titled 
“Atolls Upon Which Significant Nuclear 
Fallout Could Have Occurred From The 
Pacific Proving Grounds During Atmospheric 
Testing” suggests that the nuclear fallout was 
extending to Ailuk and other areas beside the 
four atolls (“Atolls Upon Which Significant 
Nuclear Fallout ...” 1973). The documentation 
date is June 22, 1973 which was before the 
negotiation of the compensation. It is not 
clear who wrote the documentation, but the 
U.S. Department of Energy owns this 
document. 
 
                                                     
8 See the full text of the section 177 Agreement of 
the Compact of Free Association (Marshall Islands. 
Committee on Political Education 1983: 145-165). 
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The author made some adjustments 
 
 
In the documentation, Table 1 shows 
suspected atolls of possible significant nuclear 
fallout for some nuclear testing in the 
Marshall Islands (“Atolls Upon Which 
Significant Nuclear Fallout ...” 1973). In this 
table, if we look at “CASTLE BRAVO” which 
means the ‘ Bravo’ test in operation castle, 
1954, as many as 13 atolls lists as suspected 
atolls of possible significant nuclear fallout. 
In short, this table suggests that the fallout 
disaster areas are not only the four atolls 
where the United States accepts the 
responsibility resulting from the nuclear 
tests, but also Ailuk and the wider areas. 
Out of 67 nuclear tests, the United 
States claimed only ‘ Bravo’ test led to any 
significant fallout. Table 1, however, shows 
the other tests could also potentially cause 
radiation exposure to the local people. In 
addition, the table notes that “the fallout 
pattern could have extended southwest as far 
as Ponape and other nearby areas” (“Atolls 
Upon Which Significant Nuclear Fallout ...” 
1973). In brief, the significant fallout has 
stretched beyond the current national 
borders to the neighboring countries of the 
Marshall Islands. It is debatable that this 
documentation, marked “DRAFT,” discusses 
only the “possibility” of significant fallout. 
However, if we look at another U.S. official 
report, it clearly shows the expanding of 
the nuclear disaster to Ailuk and other areas. 
For instance, this report “Radioactive 
Debris from Operation Castle: Islands of the 
Mid-Pacific” is written by Alfred J. Breslin 
and Melvin E. Cassidy of the United States 
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Atomic Energy Commission, Health and 
Safety Laboratory (Breslin and Cassidy 1955). 
Published January 18, 1955, during the time 
tests were being conducted, this document, 
however, had been classified while Marshall 
Islands and the United States negotiated the 
compensation for nuclear damages. This 
document was finally declassified in 1994. 
One of the highlights of this document is 
Table 2 “Cumulative Doses by Event and 
Location” (Breslin and Cassidy 1955: 37). It 
summarizes dates of the radiological fallout 
in each atoll in the Marshall Islands, 
including ‘ Bravo’ shot on March 1, 1954. In 
this table, if we look at Ailuk, the cumulative 
dose is 5000 mr from ‘Bravo’ test and the 
total dose of the Castle series is 6140 mr. This 
diagram also justifies the expanding 
radioactive fallout to the whole Marshall 
Islands. 
As described earlier, the significant 
fallout consequence of the testing was never 
limited within the four atolls; Bikini, 
Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik. Until today, 
however, spreading fallout was explaining by 
using a cigar-shaped map which omitted to 
expand fallout to Ailuk and other 
areas(Fig.2).  
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After the ‘ Bravo’ shot, the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission released “a 
Report on the Effects of High-Yield Nuclear 
Explosions” on February 15, 1955 (AEC 1955). 
This report showed the AEC’s view 
regarding the effect of the H-bomb test in 
1954 for civil defense planning as well as 
for military and technological purposes. 
In this report, the AEC described the 
fallout pattern of the ‘ Bravo’ shot: “the test 
explosion, at ground level, contaminated a 
cigar-shaped area extending approximately 
220 statute miles downwind and varying in 
width up to 40 miles. In addition, there was 
a contaminated area upwind and crosswind 
extending possibly 20 miles from the point 
of detonation” (AEC 1955).  
Based on this statement, the United 
States made the cigar-shaped map which 
shows distribution and amounts of radioactive 
fallout in the Marshall Islands (Fig.2). 
Officials often used this map to explain the 
effects of the nuclear test on the Marshallese 
people. 
Not only the government of the United 
States but also researchers, journalists and 
NGOs utilized this fallout map to explain the 
exposed people in the Marshall Islands. The 
credibility of the cigar-shaped map was never 
in doubt. In 1972, the Congress of Micronesia 
organized a special joint committee to 
investigate the results of irradiation on the 
people of the Marshall Islands. The following 
year, the committee published a report on   
the people of Rongelap and Utirik regarding 
the March 1, 1954 incident, and their medical 
injuries, examination and treatment 
(Congress of Micronesia 1973). This report 
contributed significantly to the investigation 
of what had been happening to the local people 
as a result of the nuclear tests. However, this 
report only payed attention to the Rongelap 
and Utirik areas. On the cover of the report 
there was the cigar-shaped map (Congress of 
Micronesia 1973). 
This distribution map shows radioactive 
fallout caused by the ‘Bravo’ Shot in 1954. 
This fallout map has been trusted implicitly to 
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explain the nuclear issues in the Marshall 
Islands. However, there are significant 
nuclear issues also in Ailuk and other areas 
that lie outside of this cigar-shaped map. That 
is to say that this fallout map cannot 
represent the whole picture of the nuclear 
catastrophe in the Marshall Islands. 
"The U.S. had different maps of nuclear 
fallout, but conveniently choose to release only 
this map" (Takahashi 2012:188), A Japanese 
historian, Dr. Hiroko Takahashi pointed out 
in her book. 
The Marshall Islands government as well 
as Dr. Takahashi et al. discovered a new 
fallout map from a declassified U.S. document 
(“Fallout from First Shot of CASTLE Test 
Operations Map with Isodose Lines”). This 
alternative map covers the radiological fallout 
spread certainly to Ailuk and other wider 
areas(Fig.3). 
Use of the cigar-shaped fallout map (Fig.2) 
renders the Ailuk nuclear catastrophe 
‘invisible’, further limiting their options. This 
map, which has been in use for so long should 
be replaced with this, newly discovered less 
deceptive one(Fig.3).  
At the national ceremony for nuclear 
victims and Remembrance Day in 2004, not 
only the designated four atolls people, but also 
the other people were given an opportunity to 
deliver a speech. Senator for Ailuk, Maynard 
Alfred’s remarks focused on their islands “in 
remembrance of the overlooked victims of 
Bravo Shot” (Alfred 2004). At the beginning, 
he stated the following: “On this occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the Bravo Shot, I wish 
to dedicate my statement to all nuclear 
victims, and most especially the victims of the 
Bravo Shot who have been overlooked, those 
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whose plight for justice have not been 
heard” (Alfred 2004).  
However, on behalf of the United States, 
Ambassador Greta N. Morris made a speech 
at the beginning that “I want to express my 
sincerest appreciation to the people of the 
Marshall Islands for their contribution to the 
protection of the Free World during the Cold 
War era through the nuclear testing 
program”; “This tremendous contribution is 
something in which all Marshallese people 
should take pride” (Morris 2004). The United 
States replaced nuclear catastrophe with 
‘contribution to security’. 
 In addition, the U.S. ambassador stated 
that “the United States deeply regrets the 
hardships the peoples of the four atolls have 
endured as a result of the testing program, as 
well as the accidental downwind injuries 
caused by one test” (Morris 2004). The 
representative of the U.S. mentioned, as 
usual, only one test and the four atolls.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
On Aug, 2013, I visited Ailuk, having not 
been to the Atolls in the past nine years. 
Cancer, unknown diseases, stillbirths and so 
forth, radioactive fallout continues to threaten 
the basis of daily life in local communities 
even up to now.  
Just before I revisited Ailuk in 2013, Line 
who served as Health aid for Ailuk people, 
passed away from liver cancer at an age of 57. 
His birth was just five months after the 
‘Bravo’ test, namely he was exposed in his 
mother’s womb on Ailuk. 
Menaja, who was born nine months after 
the ‘ Bravo’ shot, says that “I have the 
thyroid diseases. When Japanese doctors 
came to Ailuk, they found my problem.” 
Showing me a medical certificate from the 
Japanese doctor dated on January 19, 1997, 
Menaja expresses his concern: “I fell that my 
thyroid problem is getting worse. But I did 
not have medicine and I did not know where 
to go, who to ask. No doctor comes to Ailuk.” 
On the other hand, I would state that it 
was more difficult for me to see the nuclear 
catastrophe of Ailuk. When I conducted house 
surveys on the main island of Ailuk in 2001, I 
found that fifty-three people had experienced 
the ‘Bravo’ test on Ailuk. However, in 2013, 
when I counted again, the number reduced to 
only one-third, or seventeen. 
“I am exposed, but Ailuk has been 
neglected in the past 50 years. The United 
States, the United States […] Why do you 
ignore me?”, publicly decried the forgotten 
people in Majuro, capital city of the Marshall 
Islands, on March 1, 2004 or the 50th 
commemoration day of the ‘Bravo’ nuclear test. 
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An Ailuk people who participated in the 
demonstration told that “I was born and grew 
up in Ailuk eating local food. So I feel that the 
experience of the nuclear test is stabbing me 
with a knife.” 
On March 1, 2014, a decade later, 
Nuclear Victims and Survivors Remembrance 
Day events took place again in Majuro. 
However, Ailuk people did not say anything 
publically. They were silent even on the 60th 
commemoration day of the ‘Bravo’ nuclear 
detonation. One of the Ailuk survivors 
expressed his feeling, “We have talked about 
our experiences and asked for compensation, 
but it has not made any difference.” 
This article discussed the U.S. nuclear 
test issues in the Marshall Islands, focusing 
on the local people who have not been able to 
apply for the U.S. compensation, especially to 
Ailuk. Interviews with survivors as well as 
declassified U.S. documents make it clear that 
the nuclear tests have been affecting Ailuk 
people, not only the four atolls recognized by 
the U.S. government. 
The nuclear catastrophe is almost 
invisible. Radioactivity is an invisible 
substance, so the nuclear legacy is often 
neglected and hidden. In an interview with 
the author in 2014, Tony DeBrum, an eye-
witness to the nuclear testing in a “overlooked 
atoll”, Likiep, next to Ailuk atoll the and 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
Marshall Islands pointed out with nuclear 
disasters to “deny, lie and classify. It is 
nuclear culture. It is repeated in Fukushima”. 
Drawing lines among the four atolls and 
excluding Ailuk is not based on scientific data. 
These lines of four atolls are created politically. 
Please keep in mind that the lines of the four 
atolls; Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik 
make the nuclear catastrophe invisible(Fig.4). 
It is time for us to pay greater attention 
not only to the four atolls but also to the other 
areas to remind ourselves of the real nuclear 
legacy of the Marshall Islands. 
The findings should not be understood as 
an issue on just one isolated island. This paper 
argues that the United States has been 
underestimating the nuclear test effects on 
the Marshall Islands. In addition, this article 
asks not only the United States but also all of 
us to review the real nature of the nuclear 
disasters. 
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This research could not have been 
completed without steady efforts of Mr. Tempo 
Alfred as well as cooperation of a large number 
of Ailuk people. Tempo welcomed me as a host 
family in Ailuk. Tempo and I worked together 
to look for survivors from the test and took 
interviews from them in Ailuk.  A 
heartbreaking news jumped in me immediately 
after writing this article.  Mr. Tempo Alfred 
has just passed away on March 2, 2018. You are 
always in my heart. Tempo, our project is not 
over. Komoll tata, Rest in peace. 
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